Kingdom. 4 Among probable outcomes to the Marshall Islands' suits, the ICJ will be forced to draw attention to its anemic authority, and major powers may be prompted to withdraw from compulsory jurisdiction. In a lamentable irony, the Marshall Islands' suits stand to do more damage to the ICJ's legitimacy than positively impact nuclear disarmament.
This Article contends that submission to compulsory jurisdiction is the gold standard of the ICJ's legitimacy. That submission is what the Marshall Islands now threaten. India is already taking steps identical to the United States' first actions before withdrawing its submission. 5 The United Kingdom altered its agreement of jurisdiction with the ICJ, seemingly to block this very case, and has already begun to challenge the proceedings, though the grounds of its challenge are not yet public. 6 The most probable outcome of the Marshall Islands' action is not that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will be more strictly enforced, but that the Marshall Islands' applications will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (conceding how little authority the ICJ has), or that India and/or the United Kingdom will follow the example of China, France, and the United States in revoking submission to the ICJ's opt-in provision to compulsory jurisdiction, known as the Optional Clause. 7 Either of the probable outcomes could decrease the legitimacy of the ICJ, ominously continuing a downward trend nearly a century in the running. 8 The Marshall Islands' self-4. While the same may be true for Pakistan, this Article focuses on India and the United Kingdom because the major powers' withdrawals would have a greater impact on the legitimacy of the ICJ. For purposes of this work, 'major powers' will be defined by economic productivity. According to the World Bank, the ten largest national economies by GDP in 2014 were the United States, China, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Italy, Russia, and India. See World Bank, Gross Domestic Product 2014, in WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 1 (2015), http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. Pakistan's GDP was ranked forty-third. Id. 5. See infra Section VI.
See infra Section II(B)(1). See Obligations Concerning Negotiations
Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Order (June 19), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket /files/160/18710.pdf. ICJ rules maintain that pleadings may not be made public, if at all, until the oral proceedings stage. Rules of the International Court of Justice, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 6, at art. 53(2) ("The Court may, after ascertaining the views of the parties, decide that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed shall be made accessible to the public on or after the opening of the oral proceedings.") [hereinafter Rules of Court].
7. See infra Section III.
See infra Section III(A)
.
from the Optional Clause should the ICJ incorrectly find jurisdiction. India may be particularly calculated because of its present campaign for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, though such a procedural long shot may not be worth compromising in the present case. 11 Even if either case reaches judgment without prompting the withdrawal of a major power, the likelihood of enforcement is nearly non-existent; 12 thus, legitimacy will be inevitably siphoned from the ICJ. Ultimately, this Article finds little longterm merit in the Marshall Islands' strategy, and great potential loss for the ICJ as the hapless victim of its own idealism.
A. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
As a threshold matter, the murky language of the NPT handicaps the merits of the Marshall Islands' arguments. At the time of the treaty's negotiation, the five major victors of World War II maintained operational nuclear weapons. 13 The NPT came into force in 1970 as a major compromise between these states and non-weapons states. 14 Given the ongoing spoils of victor's justice, such as permanent U.N. Security Council seats, other nations were hesitant to allow the five nuclear weapons states further opportunities to permanently entrench their power. 15 India, Israel, Pakistan, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) each developed and tested nuclear weapons after the treaty came into force. 16 However, the treaty restricts the title of "nuclear weapons state" to those countries that tested weapons prior to January 1, 1967. 17 The latecomers' 11. Adding a permanent member to the Security Council would require amending the United Nations Charter, which would require a majority vote of all member states. See U.N. Charter art. 108. Such a feat is highly unlikely.
12. See infra Section III(A 25, 2014) , http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca /2014/09/25/the-nuclear-weapons-states-who-has-them-and-how-many/.
17. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. IX, July 1, only options were to join the NPT as non-weapons statestainting the legitimacy of their sophisticated status-or to abstain from joining the treaty. Most chose not to join. 18 The three pillars of the NPT are "[n]on-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy." 19 Non-proliferation and disarmament are addressed in NPT Article VI-the subject of the Marshall Islands' suits. 20 The right to peaceful use of nuclear energy is addressed in Article IV. Article VI tentatively calls for an end to the creation of nuclear weapons and the beginning of a conversation to destroy existing nuclear weapons, and to pen a new treaty for strict control of nuclear armaments. 21 The language most at issue is the commitment to " [u] ndertake[] to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." 22 Today, the Marshall Islands argue that Article VI has been breached because nuclear weapons still exist. 23 The Marshall Islands opine that the suits are " [n] ot an attempt to re-open the question of the legality of nuclear weapons," but to focus on " [t] he failure to fulfill the obligations of customary international law with respect to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament enshrined in Article VI of the NPT and declared by the Court." 24 As for obligations of custom, the battle is damned by the sheer non-existence of the customary international law on which the Marshall Islands rests much of its case. 25 The NPT interpretation is also extreme, as 1968 emphasized by attempts of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundationthe organization behind the suits-to name the Marshall Islands' legal action "the Nuclear Zero Lawsuits." 26 The fuzzy language of Article VI creates an uphill battle distinguishing compliance from non-compliance. The noncommittal language, " [u] ndertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith," makes the Marshall Islands' interpretation particularly extreme, especially in light of Article IV, which condones and even encourages the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 27 The NPT drafters demonstrated convictions that ending nuclear energy entirely was against the interests of society. 28 Even before the provision on ending the arms race, Article IV clarifies:
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 29 An "inalienable right" to nuclear research is strong language, indeed. Because the treaty leaves "nuclear arms race" undefined in Article VI, any nation wishing to parse the legal ambiguities of the treaty to fit its needs may conflate conducting research and taking up arms. Consequently, the NPT language does not position the Marshall Islands to reasonably expect success. Marshall Islands could have expected these proceedings to lead to total disarmament of nuclear weapons is an imaginative stretch for even the most idealistic among the disarmament movement. 36 Given the Marshall Islands' willingness to enter domestic jurisdiction in the United States, and the weakness of the Marshall Islands' ICJ suit against India, the Marshall Islands at least should have attempted an action against India in Indian court. Indian state and federal courts are historically welcome forums for customary international law arguments. 37 At best, the Marshall Islands missed an opportunity to show a fuller commitment to overturning every stone in seeking nuclear disarmament. At worst, the Marshall Islands missed a chance for a positive ruling that could have impacted Indian efforts to negotiate an end to the arms race. While the Marshall Islands may have missed an opportunity in India, the state took a fascinating risk in a U.S. court which may provide greater dividends for other treaty parties for years to come.
II. THE MARSHALL ISLANDS' LEGAL STRATEGIES

A. THE MARSHALL ISLANDS' SUIT IN THE UNITED STATES
On the same day that the Marshall Islands took legal action before the ICJ, the nation filed a complaint against the United States in an American federal district court. 38 The complaint was made on identical grounds to those of the ICJ cases, for breach of custom and the NPT Article VI. 39 The Marshall Islands requested that the court articulate American obligations under Article VI, determine whether the United States is in compliance, and call for remedial measures in the event of noncompliance. 40 dismiss the case on an array of grounds, including lack of standing, justiciability, lack of a private cause of action, improper venue, and timeliness. 41 The parties expanded their arguments in additional filings, as did a handful of the Marshall Islands' supporters in amicus briefs. 42 The federal district court was initially scheduled to rule on the motion to dismiss in January 2015. 43 Before doing so, the court made an atypical display of piqued interest. Two days early, the court issued a tentative decision granting the United States' motion to dismiss. 44 In a tentative order, the court dispensed of any desire to hear oral arguments on the merits, but expressed a willingness to hear twenty minutes from each side on five questions it laid out alongside the tentative ruling. 45 Soon thereafter, the court granted the United States' motion to dismiss. 46 The court found that the Marshall Islands lacked standing because the alleged injury was without redress, and the political question doctrine rendered the matter nonjusticiable. 47 The court declined to articulate American obligations under the treaty. 48 48. While making no pronouncement, the court did quote the U.S. Senate report that accompanied ratification. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 46, at 2. That report articulated the core purpose of the treaty as slowing-not stopping-the spread of nuclear weapons by prohibiting weapon states from transferring weapons and prohibiting non-weapon states from obtaining nuclear weapons. Id. If this dicta were construed as a full articulation of American NPT obligations, the Marshall Islands' current arguments would and timeliness were not reached. 49 To be fair, the Marshall Islands had a decent shot at surviving the motion to dismiss, given the lack of jurisdiction-specific precedent on the matter. 50 Counsel for the Marshall Islands filed a notice of appeal in April 2015. 51 While prospects seem dashed for the Marshall Islands in the immediate case, the action charted a potentially powerful path for other states with stronger treaty breach claims to seek relief in American court. The prospect of treaty parties choosing to seek a federal district court's interpretation of treaty obligations and assessing whether those obligations are presently met is a powerful prospect. This strategy is not new, but has been out of vogue for the better part of two centuries. The parties simply need to bring action concerning treaties of which the United States is actually in breach, and make a clearer argument for overcoming the political question doctrine. 52 American treaty breaches are hardly difficult to come by. 53 A variety of U.S. district courts interpreting American treaty obligations could highlight the best of American federalism. 54 As major powers grow increasingly reticent to bring their concerns to the International Court of Justice, and the success rate of enforcement among major powers remains abysmal, domestic courts may see an increase in the volume of international treaty be negated.
49 "regarded as a failure." 65 Since the ICJ Charter came into force nearly sixty years ago, many states found that the terms of the Optional Clause were too broad. 66 The United States initiated a trend recognizing compulsory jurisdiction with reservations. 67 France and India were among the first states to do likewise. 68 Presently, most states that submit to the Optional Clause presently do so with explicit reservations. 69 Conveniently, the Marshall Islands accepted the Optional Clause one year and one day before initiating these proceedings and, in so doing, registered multiple reservations. 70 The timing of the Marshall Islands' acceptance demonstrates the length of planning that went into the ICJ filings. By the language of the ICJ Statute alone, a state could file an Optional Clause declaration one day, bring action at the ICJ the next, and withdraw its declaration on the third day. 71 The ICJ Statute merely requires that states party to ICJ litigation have declarations in force on the same day. 72 Not to be fooled by this invitation for "hit-and-run" litigation, the United Kingdom's reservations include a provision that the ICJ will not have jurisdiction in any proceeding filed against the United Kingdom by a state whose declaration was filed less than twelve months prior to filing its application to bring suit. 73 China, France, and the United States each revoked acceptance of the Optional Clause within thirty years of submission. 74 Today, the United Kingdom is the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council that submits to the Clause. 75 Of the nine nuclear weapons states, only the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan submit to the optional clause. While the Marshall Islands brought individual action against each of the nine states before the ICJ, proceedings were only certified against the three submitting states. 76 The other six states were invited to accept the ICJ's jurisdiction strictly for these proceedings and have not done so, effectively ending those cases. 77 Neither India nor Pakistan has ever been party to the NPT. While the Marshall Islands asserts that India and Pakistan are bound to the spirit of NPT Article VI through the ICJ's 1996 advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons, 78 the next section demonstrates that the Marshall Islands' argument does not square with the advisory opinion.
A Failure on the Merits: Rewriting the 1996 Advisory Opinion
While the Marshall Islands is unlikely to reach argument on the merits, given the strength of India and the United Kingdom's prospective arguments against jurisdiction, the Marshall Islands would likely fail on the merits anyhow. Because India is not party to the NPT, the Marshall Islands could only bring an argument of facial treaty obligation against the United Kingdom. To reach beyond the NPT parties, the Marshall Islands argues that the United Kingdom and India are bound to the principles of the NPT through attenuated constructions of obligations erga omnes and customary international law. These arguments can only be made by re-writing an advisory opinion issued nearly twenty years prior.
In 1996, the ICJ responded to a request from the United Nations General Assembly to address whether "the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance [was] permitted under international law." 79 The Marshall Islands contends that the advisory opinion expressed "customary international law as it stands today" when the court quoted the NPT. 80 A brief review of the advisory opinion reveals otherwise.
The opinion unanimously affirmed the group-effort language of the NPT Article VI: "[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." 81 On the matter of the obligation to pursue disarmament negotiations, the court made no mention of custom. The prospect of the ICJ leaving such a landmark expression to derivation is unimaginable.
To the contrary, both the ICJ's findings and lack of findings regarding custom were express. The court stated unanimously that " [t] here is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons," and by eleven votes to three, " [t] here is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such." 82 In a seven-to-seven split won by the President's casting vote, the opinion noted an inability to definitively conclude "whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." 83 The opinion further expressed that any threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with pertinent international laws of armed conflict and humanitarian law, as well as any pertinent treaties or other legal obligations (unanimous), while any threat or use contrary to the United Nations Charter is but an implied expression of custom.
The Marshall Islands' erga omnes arguments are hardly stronger. Obligations erga omnes are those owed to the entire international community. 84 The term means "flowing to all." 85 By contrast, obligations erga omnes partes are more narrowly construed as owed to a specific subset of states. 86 The ICJ rarely names an obligation erga omnes, and expressly declined opportunities to do so. 87 Here, the Marshall Islands inappropriately hangs its erga omnes construction on dicta, using a single footnote to cite a single sentence from then-ICJ President Bedjaoui's declaration in the Nuclear Weapons Case. 88 President Bedjaoui noted:
As the Court has acknowledged, the obligation to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament concerns the 182 or so States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I think one can go beyond that conclusion and assert that there is in fact a twofold general obligation, opposable erga omnes, to negotiate in good faith and to achieve the desired result. 89 This non-binding dicta was expressly the judge's personal opinion and, more importantly, expressly "beyond [the] conclusion" of the ICJ. 90 The Marshall Islands' complaint against India (and Pakistan) incorrectly conflates portions of the 1996 advisory opinion as stating that every single nation has an obligation erga unlawful (unanimous 93 The Marshall Islands construes its finding by conflating a slew of phrases from the 1996 opinion as "tantamount" to an obligation erga omnes. As with the CIL argument, one could hardly imagine the ICJ leaving anything that it believes reaches the erga omnes threshold in the shadow of "tantamount" equation. The ICJ is "very cautious" when handling erga omnes at all. 94 One could imagine a future case in which the ICJ may hold that testing nuclear weapons violates an obligation erga omnes for the protection of citizens and the environment alike, drawing on Judge Weeramantry's dissent to the 1996 advisory decision. 95 95. See Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, at 517 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) ("The widespread contamination of the environment may even lead to a nuclear winter and to the destruction of the ecosystem. These results will ensue equally, whether the nuclear weapons causing them are used in aggression or in self-defence.").
action to enforce obligations erga omnes. 96 Still, the Marshall Islands' attempt to find an existing erga omnes obligation in the majority opinions of the advisory opinion is unfounded.
The Marshall Islands contends that the ICJ's advisory opinion prescribed this phantom custom and obligation erga omnes to the world, "not confining its remarks to the States Parties to the NPT." 97 But nothing in the 1996 opinion states that the obligations of the NPT Article VI extend beyond the NPT parties. Alongside interpretations of customary and conventional international law, the ICJ affirmed the language of NPT Article VI without citing the NPT and without any explanation. 98 The ICJ's earlier commentary on the NPT consistently referenced NPT obligations relative to treaty parties.
Just before declaring the matters at hand, the final prelude discussed the NPT language of Article VI. The ICJ took every opportunity to make its comments specific to states party to the treaty, using language like "each of the parties," 99 "concerns the 182 States parties," 100 and "need for all States parties." 101 Surely, if the ICJ judges intended to say that the NPT Article VI language was binding as customary international law, let alone erga omnes, they would have said so expressly. Finding a universal obligation to Article VI on behalf of parties and nonparties alike would have conflicted with the ICJ's unwillingness to find custom against the possibility of the threat or use in extreme circumstances of self-defense. 102 Even in an opinion critiqued as the ICJ's attempt to reestablish authority by creating international law at the end of a century during which the court watched its decline in prominence, 103 The NPT did not purport to ban nuclear weapons itself, and the Marshall Islands cannot simply argue that failure to negotiate an end to the arms race on its own time somehow violates measures not present in the NPT.
In sum, the Marshall Islands stand on perilously little legal ground asserting ICJ jurisdiction in the cases against India and the United Kingdom, let alone in successfully arguing on the merits. Those things established, the greater possible outcome of the legal campaign is a threat of the ICJ's already-waning legitimacy.
III. THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY OF THE ICJ IS IN JEOPARDY
Before considering the potential ramifications of the Marshall Islands' legal action, the current pulse of the ICJ must be taken. This section identifies the ICJ's prime in the rearview mirror. That backward glance sets the stage for Section IV's accounts of major powers abstaining and withdrawing from the Optional Clause.
The ICJ embodies an attempt to capture a lofty ideal in a grandiose palace with beautiful gardens, set back from a quiet street in a charming city. Unfortunately, however, the court outlived the mid-twentieth century idealism of its inception. The ICJ's Charter fundamentally establishes jurisdiction for advisory proceedings and contentious cases. 106 111 and cases in which a state which does not accept the Optional Clause grants jurisdiction to the ICJ on an ad hoc basis for the specific proceeding. 112 In cases of special agreement, "the ICJ is just a glorified arbitration panel," and an unsung arbitration panel at that. 113 Since 1949, the ICJ has heard just eighteen special agreement cases, only four of which involved a major power. 114 Treaty-or convention-based cases are hardly brought either. Since 1946, the rate at which states enter treaties with clauses granting ICJ jurisdiction has consistently decreased. 115 Given the anemic state of all other forms of ICJ jurisdiction, acceptances of the Optional Clause are arguably the gold standard of the ICJ's legitimacy. Compounding misfortune, the ICJ does not appear thrilled to ground its jurisdiction in the Optional Clause. 116 This section contends that the ICJ's legitimacy is already in jeopardy, such that the loss of India's or the United Kingdom's acceptance of the Optional Clause would be a substantial blow. The court's authority arguably peaked nearly a century ago, during its identity as the PCIJ, and recent gains in state acceptances of the Optional Clause do not begin to outweigh the withdrawals. Not to say that there is no hope for a change of course; only acknowledging that the ICJ has not seen an uptick of legitimacy in years.
A. THE ICJ'S MOST AUTHORITATIVE DAYS ARE BEHIND IT
The ICJ is not what the Permanent Court of International Justice was in its Roaring Twenties heyday, nor has it consistently attempted to maintain the same authority. 117 In the 1920s, the court presented itself "like a national supreme court, [and] international law like national law." 118 "Today, this image is more common in Europe than in the United States, and in the polemics of advocacy than in academic commentary." 119 After 1945, the ICJ became an organ of the United Nations 120 -a system "languishing now in the chaos of institutional proliferation, non-stop budgetary crises and internal reforms." 121 While the U.N. Charter deems the ICJ its "principal judicial organ," 122 submission to the ICJ is entirely separate from admission to the United Nations, 123 placing the court's authority in a precarious position from the start. Hopes for a "tight network" of states submitting to the court's jurisdiction never materialized under the League of Nations or the United Nations. 124 That said, requiring compulsory jurisdiction of all United Nations members would only lead to a parade of unenforced judgments. 125 Because the ICJ lacks a solid enforcement mechanism, the only available choices are a few freely consenting states abiding by judgments or unenforceable universal jurisdiction. complied with the judgment. 126 Even in the words of an ICJ judge, the court is an "international social function of a psychological character." 127 Over the course of the twentieth century, the ICJ has digressed to be "one cultural and political institution among others, crafting its [nuclear weapons] decision to enhance its legitimacy and pull towards compliance, the decision a drop in the ocean of world public opinion." 128 The dawn of specialized courts provides another reason why the ICJ lost de facto authority. Fewer cases had reason to come to the ICJ once European nations-the ICJ's great champions 129 -created their own Court of Human Rights with far stronger jurisdictional authority. 130 Separate courts were created for international criminal conflicts, the Law of the Sea, conflict in Lebanon, the Rwandan genocide, atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, and for international arbitration-none of which cede appellate jurisdiction to the ICJ. These courts carved authority squarely out of the original vision for the ICJ's authority as the final word on matters of international law. The ICJ's oft-used title as 'World Court' would require a remarkably involved asterisk to account for every type of international legal dispute outside the court's jurisdiction.
In sum, the ICJ has no surplus of legitimacy. There is no plausible outcome in which the Marshall Islands' cases will increase the piecemeal authority of the ICJ. Cases that acknowledge a lack of jurisdiction may not seem significant. To the contrary, United States federal courts routinely dismiss cases for lack of jurisdiction. Forcing the ICJ to acknowledge its lack of jurisdiction over something as intuitively within its authority as multilateral treaty enforcement, however, highlights the ICJ's greater failure to maintain the grand authority for which it was designed. powers," 139 and that "all in all, the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction has been regarded as a failure." 140 "The practice under the Optional Clause has confirmed the fact that relatively few states are inclined to use the [c]ourt." 141 Further, states that revoked submission to the Optional Clause were hardly making much use of it beforehand. Among the ten state members with the largest economies, two have never been respondents in an ICJ case beyond the filing stage, let alone brought action themselves. 142 On one extreme of the major powers, Russia has never accepted the Optional Clause; on the other, the United Kingdom hangs on to this day. 143 States who maintain declarations pursuant to the Optional Clause "are regarded as targets of opportunity" by aggrieved nations. 144 The other three permanent Security Council members, China, France, and the United States, each revoked acceptance of the Optional Clause over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. 145 As discussed infra, China is an outlier because its revocation was a function of the rise of the People's Republic of China. 146 In the experience of both France and the United Statesand perhaps in the forthcoming experience of the United Kingdom and/or India-a major power walked away from the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in response to legal action from a particularly small nation. These instances illustrate a growing 139. Posner, supra note 113, at 6. 140. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 261. 141. Giustini, supra note 138, at 236. 142. Posner, supra note 113, at 6 ("[C]onsider the countries that currently have the ten largest economies: USA, China, Japan, India, Germany, U.K., France, Italy, Brazil, and Russia. Four of these states-China, Japan, Brazil, and Russia (U.S.S.R.)-have never brought a proceeding, and never been a respondent beyond the filing stage." Nicaragua's assertion that it is small and weak and the United States large and powerful. Nicaragua's request would have this court violate the most fundamental tenet of modern international law; the equality of sovereign States before the law. That tenet respects the right of the weak as well as the powerful, the small as well as the large. Indeed, the States best served by a rigorous adherence to the principle of equality as well as to the rule of law in general are the small and the weak. Any departure from those principles ultimately adversely affects them the most. 148 In that case, the United States responded initially in the precise manner that India is now responding; addressing the lack of jurisdiction by arguing that its reservations to the Optional Clause barred the proceedings. 149 A thorough recollection of how France and the United States proceeded in the face of contentious proceedings before the ICJ may provide insight into how India and the United Kingdom will respond to the Marshall Islands. 1974. 156 That May, the French ambassador to the Netherlands wrote that France found the ICJ "manifestly" incompetent to hear the case. 157 The letter further stated that France had no intention to appoint an agent in the case, and requested that the ICJ withdraw the matter from its case list. 158 The ICJ requested memorials from each nation on the matter of jurisdiction. 159 New Zealand complied, and France abstained from participation. 160 Ultimately, the proceedings were rendered moot because France seemed to intend to cease its atmospheric tests. 161 The resulting withdrawal of France's submission to the Optional Clause was permanent.
Still, France maintains a noteworthy interaction with the ICJ since revocation. In 2002, the Republic of the Congo initiated proceedings against France, disputing French criminal proceedings. 162 As in the present case, France was invited to submit to the court's jurisdiction for that case alone. France consented exclusively to "the claims formulated by the Republic of the Congo." 163 Careful to avoid even the impression of creating One decade after France, the United States terminated its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction amidst similar circumstances. The American exit was prompted by a contentious case brought by Nicaragua over military and paramilitary activity. The United States involved itself in overthrowing the leftist Sandinistas regime in Nicaragua, and Nicaragua asserted that American intervention violated international law. 167 Unlike France, the United States made preemptive attempts to skirt the matter before withdrawing its submission to compulsory jurisdiction entirely. Days before Nicaragua filed its ICJ application, the United States informed the United Nations Secretary-General that its submission to compulsory jurisdiction would not apply to proceedings involving Central American nations. 168 Once in court, the U.S. standing because the state never submitted to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction itself. 169 The ICJ was not swayed, and issued a judgment that the case was properly brought under both the ICJ Statute and a treaty between the United States and Nicaragua. 170 The United States responded by withdrawing from the Optional Clause entirely, technically defaulting on the merits of the case, but paying no mind. 171 Explaining its decision, the U.S. Department of State wrote:
In 1946 we accepted the risks of our submitting to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction because we believed that the respect owed to the Court by other states and the Court's own appreciation of the need to adhere scrupulously to its proper judicial role, would prevent the Court's process from being abused for political ends. Those assumptions have now been proved wrong. 172 The episode did not conclude solely in the superpower's Optional Clause declaration withdrawal. Procedurally, the matter was complicated by the United States' failed Hail Mary to qualify the limits of its Optional Clause declaration. In response, a slew of nations subsequently altered the language of their own Optional Clause declarations, reserving the right to immediate withdrawal from compulsory jurisdiction. 173 Those nations included Australia, Cyprus, Guinea, Nigeria, Peru, Slovakia, Germany, and most notably, the United Kingdom. 174 
D. CONCLUSION ON WITHDRAWALS
Of the three NPT party nuclear weapon states to submit to the Optional Clause, three distinct withdrawal strategies were displayed. China withdrew immediately before any entanglement could occur at the ICJ. France withdrew nearly as soon as a contentious case was filed against it, not waiting for 169 the ICJ to request jurisdictional submissions. 175 The United States attempted to untimely alter its reservation, then objected to the applicant state's standing, then waited for the ICJ to determine its jurisdiction, and withdrew after losing that battle. 176 The next sections will estimate where the United Kingdom or India may find themselves along this continuum.
V. WILL THE UNITED KINGDOM WITHDRAW?
The United Kingdom keeps a low profile before the ICJ. The United Kingdom has only been an applicant before the ICJ in four cases (excluding special agreement actions), the last of which was filed in 1972. 177 Likewise, the United Kingdom has only been a respondent in four cases (excluding special agreement actions), the last of which was filed in 1999, and none of which were filed by major powers. 178 The United Kingdom's absence from the ICJ may be the result of the European Court of Human Rights, displacing much of the United Kingdom's need for a supranational court and providing more reliable jurisdiction. 179 This section will begin by exploring the procedural weakness of the Marshall Islands' argument for jurisdiction against the United Kingdom, then the weakness of the legal and factual merits of the argument, concluding with the likelihood that all this argumentation could cause the United Kingdom to withdraw its submission to the Optional Clause entirely. 179. See ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 711 (noting the firm jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights-innately connected to the treaties it is charged with enforcing-in comparison to the ICJ's "consensual regime," which the author characterizes as outdated).
Procedurally, this section finds that the United Kingdom's untested reservation to its Optional Clause declaration could be interpreted for or against the Marshall Islands; and that a loss on the procedural matter of jurisdiction alone could be grounds for the United Kingdom's withdrawal, if following the United States' tactics. Withdrawal would be considered defaulting on the merits, though it would still mean that the judgment would be unrecognized by the United Kingdom, furthering the tradition of unenforced ICJ judgments. 180 Still, if the ICJ finds jurisdiction, the United Kingdom may stick around unthreatened because arguments against the legal and factual merits of the case are so strong. Even setting aside the precedent that obligations erga omnes cannot be enforced when all states allegedly at fault are not party to the proceedings, 181 the United Kingdom is a model party to the NPT. 182 This section finds no footing for the Marshall Islands on the factual merits: the United Kingdom's significant reduction of nuclear arms is openly acknowledged by the United Kingdom's government and non-governmental organizations alike. 183 Moreover, there is no way around the United Kingdom's commitment to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, or its signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty a decade before the Marshall Islands did so. If the United Kingdom bows out of the Optional Clause, it will likely do so after the jurisdiction is decided.
A. LOSING ON PROCEDURE: THE UNITED KINGDOM'S HISTORY BEFORE THE ICJ
As the only permanent member of the Security Council currently submitting to the Optional Clause, 184 the United Kingdom maintains a sophisticated set of reservations in its declaration. 185 The aforementioned provision denying jurisdiction in "hit-and-run" cases 186 is not the only ace up the United Kingdom's sleeve. As the United Kingdom saw in the present case, the Marshall Islands was willing to submit to compulsory jurisdiction and wait a year to file action just to comply with the opposition's compulsory jurisdiction declaration. 187 Not to be beaten at its own game, the United Kingdom updated its reservations to compulsory jurisdiction eight months after the Marshall Islands filed suit. 188 The United Kingdom added a reservation excluding compulsory jurisdiction in "any dispute which is substantially the same as a dispute previously submitted to the Court by the same or another Party." 189 On June 15, 2015, the United Kingdom filed timely preliminary objections to the case. 190 In accordance with ICJ procedure, the details of the objections were not made public, though they are assumedly regarding jurisdiction. 191 The Marshall Islands was granted the standard four months to respond. 192 The new reservation seems specially tailored to block the Marshall Islands' case. The Marshall Islands' filings against the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan are nearly identical. 193 However, because the Marshall Islands filed contemporaneous action against all nine nuclear weapons states, the Marshall Islands could argue that the United Kingdom's reservation does not apply against its case because of the "previously submitted" language. 194 The ICJ found against Japan on similar jurisdictional questions within the past decade. 195 If argued, the "previously submitted" language could burn the United Kingdom in the same manner as Japan. Because the ICJ has had no prior opportunity to interpret the United Kingdom's new reservation, the court's interpretation for the matter at hand cannot be assessed with precision. If the United Kingdom's presumed argument against jurisdiction is denied, the nation could imaginably go the way of France or the United States, withdrawing entirely from submission to the Optional Clause, rather than face a potentially strong ruling from the ICJ. Again, because the United Kingdom's reservations include a provision for immediate effect after withdrawal, 196 the United Kingdom would not be left adrift waiting out its own action as the United States was against Nicaragua. 197 Again, if the United Kingdom does argue against the ICJ's jurisdiction in any form, the strategy not to do so up front, as India did, is curious. 198 
B. LOSING ON THE MERITS: THE UNITED KINGDOM'S HISTORY WITH THE NPT
The merits of the Marshall Islands' case against the United Kingdom are just as weak as the procedure. While the Marshall Islands can argue NPT breach against the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom has arguably acted as a model nuclear weapon state in terms of treaty compliance. To public knowledge, the United Kingdom has not tested a nuclear weapon since 1991. 199 Even the Nuclear Threat Initiative acknowledges that "[t]he British government has progressively reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile." 200 In October 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron presented a Strategic Defence and Security Review to Parliament. 201 Among other things, the study reassessed what nuclear arsenal was necessary for "credible deterrence" in light of the international order. 202 Finding that a smaller arsenal would suffice for credible deterrence, the government announced plans to reduce its requirement for "operationally available warheads" by twenty-five percent, and reduce its overall nuclear weapon stockpile, among other actions. 203 Even if the Marshall Islands were able to argue the non-existent unilateral obligation from the United Kingdom to the island nation, the Marshall Islands would be hard pressed to argue that the United Kingdom has not made sufficient strides to further nuclear nonproliferation.
The 
Marshall Islands:
Some have argued that the way to this goal is to ban nuclear weapons now, or to fix a timetable for their elimination. The UK considers that this approach fails to take account of, and therefore jeopardises, the stability and security which nuclear weapons can help to ensure. A declaratory ban, or a timetable not underpinned by the necessary trust, confidence and verification measures, would jeopardise strategic stability. None of us would gain from a loss of that stability. 205 The representative went on to defend fellow major powers, drawing attention to collective reductions of stockpiles between the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom alike. 206 Whether viewed alone or relative to other nuclear weapons states, short of the argument that the mere continued existence of nuclear weapons constitutes an NPT breach, anyone would have a hard time arguing that the United Kingdom is noncompliant to the NPT-let alone the Marshall Islands' irresponsibly construed obligation erga omnes to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." 207 C. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES COMPARED TO PAST OPTIONAL CLAUSE WITHDRAWALS Among the Optional Clause revocations, the United Kingdom's present stance is most analogous to the United States' experience. The United Kingdom sent representation to a preliminary meeting with the ICJ President in June 2014. 208 That act is distinguishable from French non-engagement.
Because the United Kingdom's Optional Clause declaration has such strong reservation language, the state is likely to have confidence in its preliminary argument against jurisdiction.
The United Kingdom chose to stick around for the jurisdiction arguments as the United States did, assumedly hoping that the case will be dismissed. The United States withdrew after unsuccessfully arguing against jurisdiction, and the United Kingdom may do the same if its own arguments fail. After all, as the only permanent Security Council member currently submitting to the ICJ, the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the Optional Clause is not likely to prompt an image problem or inconvenience its judicial needs.
The United Kingdom seems to have little to fear on the merits, though the sheer shock of reaching the merits may give enough pause for the United Kingdom to weigh the risk of continuing to submit to the Optional Clause. While the Marshall Islands can only argue attenuated customary international law breaches against India or Pakistan, the Marshall Islands can compound the CIL case with treaty breach argument against the United Kingdom. Luckily, given that there is some small risk to reaching the merits, the United Kingdom may be able to argue in the alternative against the case.
Still, if arguments against jurisdiction fail, the United Kingdom could also pose a separate argument to avoid the merits. to jurisdiction. 213 Then, by a vote of thirteen to one, the court held that it could not decide the interrelated issues concerning France, the United Kingdom, and the United States without deciding the greater issue concerning all the parties. 214 Therefore, Albania's lack of Optional Clause acceptance kept the entire case out of the ICJ. 215 While some could contrast the Nicaragua v. U.S. decision, in which the ICJ dismissed the American objection that Nicaragua lacked standing for not submitting to the Optional Clause, the position of the parties distinguishes the cases. 216 Nicaragua arguably submitted to the international equivalent of personal jurisdiction by bringing its case before the ICJ, whereas Albania was a respondent whose actions could not be construed as submitting to the court's jurisdiction.
The United Kingdom could argue the same principle today. Given the communal nature of the requirements of the NPT Article VI-a commitment to dialogue among nations rather than unilateral action-how could the ICJ rule on the United Kingdom's compliance when six of the nine nuclear weapons states do not accept the Optional Clause and have not accepted the court's invitations to accept jurisdiction in this matter?
If the United Kingdom were to make and lose a Monetary Gold argument, the state would be foolish not to withdraw its Optional Clause declaration. The prospect of being held responsible for other states' collective actions would be a dangerous precedent. Luckily, should the United Kingdom feel inclined to withdraw consent entirely, the United Kingdom currently reserves the right to do so with immediate effect, unlike the United States. 217 Bottom line, short of the United Kingdom arguing against jurisdiction and the ICJ agreeing, this case will not provide the United Kingdom any good reason to maintain Optional Clause submission. The United Kingdom may already have one foot out the door as is given the absence of any other permanent Security Council members from Optional Clause submission. Drawing from the French experience, the United Kingdom could rest assured that its withdrawal would not foreclose the option of submitting to the ICJ's jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis in respond to the Marshall Islands, in each prior instance India strove to block the proceedings by arguing that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction. 222 India was among the first nations to file a declaration of acceptance (and reservations) to the Optional Clause, accepting compulsory jurisdiction in 1940. 223 Portugal filed its declaration on December 19, 1955, and its application against India on December 22. 224 The case concerned whether India violated obligations to Portugal's right of passage in Indian coastal territory. 225 Not to be out-filed, India updated its reservations on January 7, 1956. 226 India made six preliminary objections to jurisdiction, including an unsuccessful argument that one of Portugal's reservations was inappropriately retroactive and therefore out of line with Article 36 of the ICJ Charter. 227 Three further objections were based on India's own declaration, including arguments concerning reciprocity and exclusive domestic jurisdiction. 228 The ICJ voted overwhelmingly to reject four of the objections, but joined two to the merits of the case, including the matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction and the date of commencement for ripeness purposes. 229 The court found that it had jurisdiction, but ultimately found that India had not violated its obligations to Portugal. 230 India's single application to the ICJ was unusual. Organization. 231 In 1971, India appealed to the ICJ for a ruling on whether the Council was competent to entertain Pakistan's complaint. 232 In turn, Pakistan objected that the ICJ was not competent to determine the Council's competence. 233 Ultimately, the ICJ held that it was competent to determine the Council's competence, and that the Council was authorized to rule on Pakistan's complaint. 234 Pakistan's filing against India in 1973 alleged genocide against Pakistani nationals and was voluntarily dismissed after the two nations negotiated in New Delhi. 235 Pakistan filed against India again in 1999. 236 In that case, the ICJ found that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits. 237 Among other reasons, the court relied on India's September 1974 declaration relating to the Optional Clause. 238 India's "Commonwealth reservation," barring jurisdiction in matters brought between Commonwealth states, was successfully invoked. 239 Looking forward, one commentator noted, "[g]iven the Court's approach to the Optional Clause and the extremely broad reservations contained in India's Optional Clause declaration, it is unlikely that the Court will be able to entertain any dispute involving that country, whether as applicant or as respondent, based on the Optional Clause." 240 Indeed, for now, India may bet that its strong reservations will block the Marshall Islands' case. While India largely hung its hat on the Commonwealth reservation in 1999, the Marshall Islands is no Commonwealth state. Further, in cases of major powers subsequent to India's last brush with the World Court, such broad deference has not been shown to reservations in Optional Clause declarations. In the past decade, Japan lost arguments against ICJ jurisdiction. 241 India's reservations continued to ebb and flow over the late twentieth century, more carefully worded as time passed. As one commentator characterized India's reservations, "[s]uch exceptions effectively nullify any acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction." 242 Another predicted:
Nowhere has the quantity and density of reservations reached the same level as in the case of India, which has succeeded in shaping an instrument that will certainly prevent any attempt ever to bring an application against it, thus converting the act of acceptance into a barely veiled act of non-acceptance. 243 India did not withdraw its Optional Clause declaration the last time the nation was forced to argue against jurisdiction on grounds of its reservations. Why would India withdraw now? Because the Court has since construed Optional Clause reservations more narrowly, and at least one major power lost the jurisdiction argument on grounds of its reservations within the past decade.
If seeking to argue against jurisdiction, India could also make the Monetary Gold argument as the United Kingdom may, asserting that the ICJ cannot decide a matter of breached obligations when some bound parties are not included. 244 Further, without even taking the energy to eviscerate the Marshall Islands' erga omnes construction from the 1996 advisory opinion, India could analogize to the 2012 Belgium v. Senegal case and characterize the obligation as erga omnes partes, which seems to be a more comfortable stance for the ICJ-arguing that the obligation is specific to the subset of states party to the NPT. 245 While India may have a strong case against jurisdiction, and even a memory of winning the argument before, losing the jurisdiction question may prompt India to withdraw its declaration to the Optional Clause for sheer desire to avoid entanglement in the merits arguments.
B. LOSING ON THE MERITS: INDIA'S HISTORY WITH THE NPT
Luckily for India, given the unsure footing of its potential arguments for procedural bars, the Marshall Islands' merits claims are weak. The Marshall Islands' case against India can only be based on attenuated interpretations of custom and obligations erga omnes. India's history relative to the NPT is rich.
India's position toward nuclear weapons and the international community, generally, can best be summarized by the mid-twentieth century statement of Dr. Homi Bhabha, Secretary of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy under Jawaharlal Nehru: "We must have the capability [for nuclear weapons]. We should first prove ourselves and then talk of Gandhi, non-violence and a world without nuclear weapons." 246 India has consistently employed strong rhetoric against proliferation, all the while developing its own technology and stating that non-proliferation should only be discussed when every nuclear weapons state intended to do away with their weapons.
India made strong efforts to influence the language of the NPT in early deliberations. Negotiations on NPT's Articles IV, V, and VI were insufficient to convince India to sign, and India was the only nation to reject the NPT on principle. 247 According to Indira Gandhi, "India's refusal to sign the NPT was based on enlightened self-interest and the considerations of national security . . . nuclear weapon powers insist on their right to continue to manufacture more weapons . . . . India does not propose to manufacture nuclear weapons." 248 India's subsequent nuclear explosion in 1974 was allegedly a peaceful one, though twenty-three years later the bomb designer stated, "there was nothing peaceful about it. I just want to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful." 249 By then, India was stuck. In what Indian officials deemed "nuclear apartheid," the nation could join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state-the only option available to a nation that tested after January 1967, maiming the legitimacy of the nation's proud nuclear program-or remain a rogue, armed outsider. 250 India chose the latter. India's rhetoric again countered its actions two decades later. Anticipating the ICJ's advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, India submitted a brief to the ICJ in 1995, strongly denouncing the legality of even the "production and manufacture of nuclear weapons;" just three years later, India conducted five nuclear tests. 251 Not surprisingly, Pakistan responded with six nuclear tests within two weeks. 252 If anyone was in a nuclear arms race, patently violating the spirit of NPT Article VI, India and Pakistan were. But could a nuclear arms race by non-parties to the NPT amount to a violation of international law? Despite India's patent refusal to sign the NPT, seemingly anticipating a suit such as the Marshall Islands' present action, India carefully argued that its policies and procedures were in line with the NPT. India likewise refused to sign the Rome Statute in 1999, in protest that use of nuclear weapons was not included as a punishable crime. 253 India's fresh nuclear weapons tests weakened its discourse. 254 When India chose not to attend the 2000 NPT Review Conference, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh told Parliament that their government functioned "consistent[ly] with the key provisions of [the] NPT that apply to nuclear weapon states," notably Article VI. 255 While the five nuclear weapon states acting under the blessing of the NPT have each abstained from further testing, and none are engaged in a "nuclear arms race," India continues to build a "credible minimum deterrent" amounting to an arms race with Pakistan, and an arguable attempt to establish nuclear weaponry on equal footing with China. 256 Throughout this period, the United States and other world powers overwhelmingly accepted India's nuclear weapons status, even outside the blessing of the NPT. 257 Any global appeals the Marshall Islands would attempt to make against India coloring outside the lines of the NPT would likely fall on deaf ears-at least the ears of major powers. 258 
C. INDIA'S PREDICAMENT RESEMBLES THOSE OF FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THEIR OPTIONAL CLAUSE REVOCATIONS
Long before the Marshall Islands filed suit against India at the ICJ, India laid groundwork to defend itself. India's reservations to the Optional Clause were meticulously planned, and the nation made clear that even as a non-party to the NPT, India found itself in compliance with the NPT's requirements for nuclear weapons states-at least it did fourteen years ago.
When the day finally came to answer accusations of violating international law with its nuclear weapons, India did not refute the attenuated erga omnes argument. At first glance, this strategy seems odd, as the Marshall Islands' argument seems easily overcome. However, India's actions could be easily explained by an intention to ultimately withdraw from the Optional Clause and to keep the company of other world powers in how it does so. India argued that this case falls within one of India's reservations to the Optional Clause, just as France argued in the Nuclear Tests case and as the United States against Nicaragua. 259 In this case, India declined to attend an initial meeting at the ICJ to flesh out procedural matters, 260 just as France declined its initial meeting before withdrawal. 
D. INDIA MAY STAY FOR LEGITIMACY
Compulsory submission is seemingly dispensable these days. Why would India cling to it? Perhaps for legitimacy. 261 India has little footing as a non-party to the NPT and only recently gained a permanent ICJ judge for the first time in more than two decades. 262 India is certainly not holding on to European idealism of international law. Even in its history of nuclear weapons development, India has proven to be a scrappy, self-serving country willing to assert its own opinions and to absorb the consequences of not joining the NPT when its attempts to influence NPT negotiations failed. More likely, India is self-conscious about legitimacy and social capital. 263 India has long wished to join the ranks of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Were the matter simply left to the current permanent members, India may gain a permanent seat with little fanfare. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown was on board in 2008, though seemingly without the company of the United States, Russia, or China. 264 Nicolas Sarkozy strongly supported the vision in 2010. 265 Barack Obama vocalized support during his 2010 visit to India, 266 and again when visiting in early 2015. 267 China and Russia both appear to have warmed to the idea. 268 Still, the current permanent members would not make the decision in a vacuum. An effort to give India a permanent seat would require an amendment to the U.N. Charter, requiring a vote of two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of all U.N. members, including every permanent Security Council member. 269 As India gains pivotal progress toward a permanent seat, its hesitance to rock the boat before another United Nations organ would be understandable.
VII. CONCLUSION: BETTER LUCK LEAVING THE ICJ FOR DOMESTIC COURTS (OR, WHAT THE MARSHALL ISLANDS GOT RIGHT)
Given the French and American experiences withdrawing from the Optional Clause, an imminent British or Indian withdrawal is wholly imaginable. While either state may remain in order to make a statement, there is no imaginable scenario in which the Marshall Islands could win either case on the merits. A finding of obligations erga omnes or customary international law would be unfounded and unprecedented; India has never been party to the NPT, and if nothing else, the Monetary Gold precedent should terminate these proceedings. 270 In any probable outcome, the ICJ will likely lose an additional shred of legitimacy.
As the world waits to learn how India and the United
